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Who is Sitting in the Stands?
The Income Levels of Sports Fans
John J. Siegfried and Timothy Peterson
Vanderbilt University
About a decade ago, an unprecedented  professional sports stadium
and arena construction boom emerged in the United States as profes-
sional sports team owners began to recognize their ability to play
image-conscious metropolitan areas off against each other.  New stadi-
ums and arenas were attractive to these team owners not because their
games could not be played in existing facilities—most of the existing
stadiums and arenas were less than thirty years old and many were far
from sold out—but rather because revenue prospects began to depend
on new stadium configurations.  Architects of the 1960s and 1970s who
built the old-style arenas and stadiums did not anticipate how many
wealthy individuals and corporations would be willing to pay for the
status, exclusivity, and amenities of club seats and luxury boxes.  How-
ever, rapid economic growth, rising income inequality, and the increas-
ing popularity of relative status have combined to create an enormous
demand for high-end sports services in the 1990s.  When team owners
report that their stadium is “inadequate,” they mean that it is inade-
quate to produce the revenues that the team owner would prefer to col-
lect.
Revenue enhancement alone, however, is not necessarily worth-
while to team owners.  Prospective incremental revenues must be
weighed against the additional costs required to attract them.  That is
where a taxpayer-financed stadium fits into a team’s income statement.
Stadiums that provide exclusive seating in luxury boxes and club seats
are expensive to build.  Costs are always lower, of course, if the owner
can get someone else to foot the construction bill and then pay them a
trivial rental rate for use of the facility, as characterizes many recently
52 Siegfried and Peterson
constructed sports stadiums and arenas.1  Furthermore, without the
sunk costs of stadium ownership to tie him down, the owner increases
his ability to extract further concessions from the local population by
periodically threatening to move the team.  If the team receives reve-
nues from nonsports uses of the facility throughout the year, a contract
provision that is fashionable in modern stadium and arena leases, the
owners’ revenues can be expanded further.
 The vast majority of premier league professional sports stadiums
constructed in the 1990s have been financed partly by taxpayers,
including federal, state, and local (Noll and Zimbalist 1998, appendix
to chapter 1).  About 25 state and local governments have provided at
least $100 million each in subsidies to professional sports teams
(Rosentraub 1997, pp. 16).  Even the few new stadiums that have been
privately financed usually have benefited from a substantial public
underwriting for access roads and utilities infrastructure.
Federal taxpayers contribute to these stadiums and arenas prima-
rily by means of the federal government forgoing tax revenue on inter-
est paid to holders of tax exempt municipal bonds used to finance
construction (Zimmerman 1998).  These forgone tax revenues must
either be made up elsewhere or public services reduced accordingly.
State and local tax support is more direct, often involving direct outlays
of property tax receipts, or the earmarking of either sales tax revenues
collected on tickets to the events held in the facility or revenues from a
lottery.  Unless all of the facility’s patrons are from outside the local
area, at least some, and usually a large proportion of these earmarked
tax revenues would have been collected by the state or local tax author-
ity anyway as local consumers purchased other taxable items as part of
their established expenditure pattern.
In spite of the often emotional public debate about the equity con-
sequences of public policy, the controversy surrounding stadiums and
arenas has focused largely on local economic development prospects
and opportunities to enhance a metropolitan area’s public image.
Unfortunately, the debates usually center on the financing of stadiums
and arenas rather than on net economic effects.  Financial transfers are
treated as costs to those who provide the financing and benefits to those
who receive it regardless of the expansion or contraction of real eco-
nomic activity.  The focus on financial implications of public subsidies
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for sports facilities leaves both the efficiency and equity consequences
of such policies largely unexamined.
EVALUATING PUBLIC PROJECTS
In the 1960s economists adopted a taxonomy for evaluating public
projects.  This taxonomy involved two parts: efficiency and equity
effects (Okun 1975).  A literature developed to assist in measuring eco-
nomic benefits and costs and especially in identifying easy to overlook
opportunity costs.  Methodological contributions focused on properly
weighing benefits against costs.   
In recent years economists have begun to apply this taxonomy to
the public provision of sports facilities.   Robert Baade (1987, 1994,
1996) stimulated more careful analysis of the claims of stadium propo-
nents through a series of studies assessing the economic impact of new
teams and/or facilities on local economies.  Roger Noll and Andrew
Zimbalist’s (1997) recently published Sports, Jobs, and Taxes orga-
nizes much of what is now known about the efficiency consequences of
publicly provided stadiums and arenas and helps to distinguish real
economic effects of such facilities from the financial transfers sur-
rounding them.
EQUITY ISSUES
To date, however, there seems to have been little interest in the
equity consequences of public policy relating to sports facilities.  Some
groups that oppose political referendums on public subsidies for sports
stadiums or arenas assert that the poor are buying playgrounds for the
rich, but there is little objective evidence available about the income
redistribution consequences that arise when communities allocate pub-
lic funds for the construction of sports facilities for privately owned
professional sports teams.2
The distributional consequences of public projects are complicated
because many direct burdens and benefits are passed along to taxpayers
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or beneficiaries who do not attract attention.  The extent to which bene-
fits and/or costs are passed along depends on the magnitude of various
elasticities of supply and demand that are extremely difficult to evalu-
ate.  For example, a common method of financing new venues is to ear-
mark either sales taxes collected on tickets sold to events in the facility,
on restaurants, on rental cars, or on hotel and motel use.  Even if one
assumes that none of these taxes would have been collected by the tax-
ing authority were those who buy tickets to have purchased alternative
items, the ultimate incidence of such ad valorem sales or hotel taxes
depends on the elasticities of supply and demand.  As thousands of
introductory economics students show on problem sets and exams each
year, if demand is inelastic and supply is elastic, the consumers bear
relatively more of the burden.  On the other hand, if demand is elastic,
and supply is inelastic, the suppliers bear most of the burden.  The
challenge, of course, is measuring the relevant elasticities.
WHO PAYS THE SUBSIDY?
A careful accounting of the distributional effects of publicly subsi-
dized stadium or arena projects requires an assessment of the sources
of revenue as well as the beneficiaries of the services provided and the
recipients of the revenues. Identifying who pays for stadium subsidies
is complicated because there are usually multiple revenue sources, and
the ultimate incidence of different taxes varies.  Local taxes are raised
primarily via levies on retail sales, property, and hotel and motel use.
Because the marginal propensity to consume is less than one, general
sales taxes are usually considered regressive, especially if the tax base
includes food and clothing.  Property taxes, at least in intermediate
ranges, are thought by some economists (Pechman 1985) to be propor-
tional; at the higher ranges they may be progressive (O’Sullivan 1996).
The incidence of hotel and motel taxes is difficult to assess because
such taxes are paid primarily by myriad businesses that, in competitive
markets, would pass them along to their customers.   Incidence would
ultimately depend on the affluence of those customers.  In an analysis
that tried to trace such specific taxes through the economy to the indi-
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viduals who ultimately pay them,  Siegfried, McElroy, and Sweeney
(1982) found hotel and motel taxes to be progressive.
State revenues to subsidize sports facilities are raised primarily from
general sales taxes, personal and corporate income taxes, lotteries, or a
“sin tax” on alcohol.  Both federal, and state or local personal income
taxes are modestly progressive (Clotfelter and Cook 1989, p. 227).  The
incidence of corporate income taxes is complex and remains controver-
sial.  Lotteries are regressive, although they may be less objectionable
because they are a “voluntary tax”  (Clotfelter and Cook 1989, p. 223).
Siegfried and colleagues found taxes on alcohol to be mildly progres-
sive; Clotfelter and Cook (p. 227) report evidence that taxes on alcohol
are regressive.
Finally, the federal government’s revenue sources are so diverse
that it would be virtually impossible to predict which taxes would be
higher because of federal subsidies to sports facilities.  Because feder-
ally tax exempt municipal bonds are attractive only to those lenders in
relatively high marginal income tax brackets, however, we can be sure
that some of the benefits accrue to relatively high income individuals.
The costs are borne either by those who would have benefited from the
alternative public projects that would have been funded in the absence
of the tax break for municipal bonds used to finance sports facilities or
by those who pay the marginal taxes.
WHO BENEFITS DIRECTLY FROM THE SUBSIDY?
The incidence of taxation is a subject for another day, however.
Here we want to learn about the income characteristics of the benefi-
ciaries of publicly provided sports facilities.  This is but a simple first
step toward assessing the distributional impact of public subsidies for
professional sports facilities.  To address this question, it is useful first
to categorize the primary beneficiaries of subsidies for new sports sta-
diums or arenas.
The most obvious beneficiaries are claimants on team revenues.
New sports stadiums are desired by teams because they enhance team
revenues through opportunities to lease luxury boxes, sell club seating
tickets at premium prices, increase concession revenues, and expand
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advertising revenues, e.g., signs in the stadium and/or stadium “naming
rights.”  To the extent that new playing facilities increase the demand
for tickets, owners of teams in other league cities benefit too through
revenue sharing in Major League Baseball (MLB) and in the National
Football League (NFL).  Net revenues also climb as a team’s facility
costs disappear.  Players and team owners carve up most of profes-
sional sports teams’ revenues.  Both groups are comprised of very high
income individuals.  There is little doubt that to the extent that public
subsidies of sports stadiums and arenas allow teams to increase net rev-
enues by expanding revenue opportunities and reducing team costs, the
lion’s share of those revenues go to individuals in the top one-tenth of
one percent of the national income distribution.
Of the 115 major league men’s professional sports teams operating
in 1998, the controlling interest in at least 28 was owned by an individ-
ual on the 1998 Forbes magazine list of the wealthiest 400 Americans
(Gorham, Kafka, and Neelakantan 1998).  If the 50 wealthiest family
groups and minority interests in sports teams are added to the number
of teams owned by “top 400” wealthiest individuals, the count swells
to 38.3  Public subsidies to stadiums or arenas constitute a subsidy pro-
gram for some of the wealthiest people in the country, each of whom
has net assets exceeding half a billion dollars.
Players are not nearly as wealthy as owners.  The average income
of players in the National Basketball Association (NBA), National
Hockey League (NHL), NFL, and MLB in 1998 was $2.6, $1.2, $0.8,
and $1.3 million, respectively; minimum salaries in the leagues were
$242,000, $125,000, $158,000, and $170,000, respectively.  While not
in the stratosphere of the average team owner’s wealth, even those pre-
mier league professional athletes earning the “minimum wage” earn
numerous standard deviations of income more than typical Americans.
Those athletes who are paid the average for their league earn more in a
single year than an average American might expect to earn in a life-
time.
Team owners and players receive most of a team’s incremental rev-
enues because they own the ultimate scarce resources.  Team owners
possess the scarce rights to participate in the premier league in their
sport.  They limit entry into the league to preserve this scarcity value.
Absent scarcity of franchises, there would be little reason for anyone to
pay much of anything in excess of the market value of future player
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contracts (the relatively small extent to which the value of the players’
services exceeds their contractual salaries) and equipment for an exist-
ing franchise when they could simply secure a new one.  Since expan-
sion franchises have no player contracts or equipment, they would be
free.   The actual price of franchises reflects monopoly power and little
else.  Owners clearly have title to a scarce resource—access to the pre-
mier league championship.
Players also possess monopoly rights, since they (and especially
“star” players) own the scarce resources necessary to produce profes-
sional sporting events.  Fans would not be willing to pay to see Tim
Peterson and John Siegfried replace Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen
on the NBA champion Chicago Bulls.  In fact, fans would not be will-
ing to pay as much to see top NBA “lottery” draft picks replace Jordan
and Pippen.  Star players control a differentiated product for which
there are often no good substitutes in the eyes of the fans—their ath-
letic talent and personalities.  Under such circumstances economic the-
ory predicts that at least some portion of net revenues made available
by a public subsidy that expands gross revenues and reduces facility
costs will be transferred to players.4  These net revenues are virtually
all economic rent.
In addition to the revenues divided between players and owners,
there may be direct benefits that accrue to consumers.  Only in that rare
case when a consumer is completely indifferent to the choice between
purchasing a good or service or not is no consumer’s surplus created.
In recent years, sports teams have successfully designed price discrim-
ination schemes to extract some of this consumer’s surplus.   However,
because few people agonize over the decisions either to buy a ticket or
to watch a game on television, there is no question that some surplus
remains for almost every purchaser of tickets or viewer of games on
television.
The direct demand for professional sporting events is manifested
primarily through the demand for tickets to live professional sporting
events and the demand for viewing games on television.  Although
there is no way to determine the magnitude of consumer surplus
enjoyed by those who buy tickets or view games on television, we can
be sure that most of the fans receive some consumer surplus.  It is of
more than passing interest to identify these individuals because they
are the local consumers who will enjoy increased utility from a subsidy
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to a stadium or arena that either prevents a team from moving else-
where or lures a team into the area.5  Because there is little question
that the owners and players are relatively affluent, the only prospective
direct beneficiaries of public sports facility subsidies who are not
wealthy are the fans. 
INDIRECT BENEFITS
The objective of this essay is to identify the income distribution
position of the direct consumers of sports.  In addition to direct private
benefits manifested in consumer’s surplus, some indirect “public con-
sumption” benefit is likely to be provided by sports stadiums or arenas.
Such external benefits may arise from increased self-esteem enjoyed
by residents who believe that they are better off living in a “big league
city,” or who at least believe that their lives are enhanced if others view
their community as a “major league place” (Rosentraub 1997, pp. 25–
26).   The fact that virtually all well- conducted studies of the economic
development effects of professional sports teams and/or new stadiums
or arenas find no impact whatsoever (an exception being a recent study
by Coats and Humphreys [1999], who found a negative effect) does not
undermine the possibility of external benefits, although it casts doubt
on their magnitude.  Trickle-down economic impacts are not the only
source of external benefits.  So long as the local residents believe that
they are better off with an enhanced public image and we respect con-
sumer sovereignty, then they benefit from the team, stadium, or arena
whether the basis for their belief is valid or not.
External benefits can also arise from the personal consumption of
following a team’s fortunes, discussing the team’s success around the
water cooler, or as a rallying point that brings a community together.
Of course external costs may also arise from depression caused by a
team that chronically loses, increased traffic congestion on game days,
domestic conflict generated by the home team’s game being televised
during Thanksgiving dinner, or time diverted from work effort as
employees congregate around the water cooler more frequently than
their supervisor would like.  
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It is difficult to determine how such external benefits might be dis-
tributed across individuals at different points along the income distribu-
tion.  Before we even worry about their distribution, however, we need
to document the existence and magnitude of external benefits.  While
doing so, we should also catalog any external costs associated with the
presence of a professional sports team.  Zimmerman (1998, p. 122) sug-
gests that these benefits might be valued equally by all individuals or
that fans (particularly those fans who purchase tickets to games) are
likely to value them more than others.  If such external benefits are dis-
tributed in proportion to fan purchases of tickets, then our efforts to
understand the income position of those who purchase tickets and view
games on television will simultaneously reveal the distribution of the
external benefits.  On the other hand, the distribution of these external
benefits may differ from the distribution of benefits that accrue to buy-
ers of tickets and viewers of televised game broadcasts.  
WHO BUYS THE TICKETS TO SPORTING EVENTS?
The individuals who purchase tickets for professional sporting
events are the people who enjoy the consumers’ surplus from the direct
consumption of sporting event services.  Thus, it is of interest to learn
precisely who are the people who enjoy benefits in excess of the price
they pay for tickets to the games.  It is these people who secure direct
benefits from the presence of a professional sporting team and/or sta-
dium or arena.  To the extent that a publicly subsidized stadium or
arena attracts a team to a community or prevents an incumbent fran-
chise from moving elsewhere, it is those who buy tickets to the games
or who receive more enjoyment from watching games on television
that involve their hometown team rather than teams from other cities
who are direct beneficiaries of the public subsidy.
Our argument that fans benefit from a publicly subsidized stadium
is not a claim that ticket prices are lower because of the public subsidy.
Indeed, as a reduction in fixed costs, a rent subsidy imbedded in a 25-
or 30-year lease is unlikely to affect ticket prices at all.  Rather it is a
balancing of marginal costs against marginal revenues that identifies
the profit maximizing ticket price level.  Our interest in the affluence of
60 Siegfried and Peterson
sports ticket purchasers instead hinges on the belief that the very exist-
ence of the opportunity to purchase tickets and attend games in one’s
hometown depends on the public subsidy because of the artificial scar-
city of premier league teams created by the monopoly leagues.  The
public subsidy creates some amount of consumer surplus for the fans
who purchase tickets by means of its responsibility for the team’s pres-
ence.  Each fan who purchases tickets must be better off than he or she
would have been in the absence of the team, otherwise they would sim-
ply continue their previous consumption pattern and decline to pur-
chase tickets.
THE DATA
As part of its Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), the Bureau of
Labor Statistics interviews a continuous rotating panel of households
in the U.S. to collect data for calculating the Consumer Price Index.
This nationally representative recall survey provides information on
expenditure patterns and income levels of slightly more than 5,000
households each quarter.6  It is constructed so that each quarter can be
treated as an independent sample; thus four quarters of data furnishes a
sample of about 20,000 U.S. households.
We use two types of information from the 1994 CES samples: pre-
tax family income and itemized expenditures for: “admission fees to
sporting events,” and “admission fees to sporting events on out-of-town
trips.”  Admission fees include both single-game and season tickets.
All of the sporting event tickets documented in the CES were pur-
chased by individuals; we have no information on tickets purchased by
businesses or who enjoys the use of those tickets.  It is likely that this
omission biases downward the reported income levels of those who
attend sporting events.
Sporting events are all inclusive.  They range from auto and horse
racing to professional golf and tennis, or whatever survey respondents
consider “sporting events.”  Minor league baseball as well as college
sporting events are included.  A large fraction of the money spent on
tickets, however, is accounted for by the four major men’s professional
team sports—baseball, basketball, football, and ice hockey, each of
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which is well practiced in the art of negotiating subsidized facilities for
their team’s games.7
Data from the 1972–1973 CES, revealed that the typical purchas-
ers of season tickets to sporting events had median incomes 58 percent
above the average (McElroy, Siegfried, and Sweeney 1982).  Those
purchasers of single-game tickets had median incomes about 10 per-
cent above the overall average.  In the early 1970s, sports teams had
not yet discovered the lucrative personal seat license (PSL) system of
extracting payments in excess of the face value of tickets from more-
rabid fans.  The price of PSLs makes it unlikely that a stadium crowd in
2000 consists of many people holding minimum wage jobs, aside from
the ushers and concession workers serving those in the club seats and
luxury boxes.  If anything, the disparity between the income level of
those attending professional sporting events and the average “Joe Six-
pack” has widened over time.
By 1994 the CES no longer separated season tickets from single-
game tickets.  It did, however, distinguish tickets purchased while at
home from those purchased while traveling out-of-town.  We combine
these two categories of sporting event tickets into a single “sporting
event tickets” category.8
Our analysis is based on four quarters of data from 1994.  Tickets
to sporting events were purchased by an average of 5.6 percent of the
consumer units each quarter (totaling 1,147 consumer units for the
year).  Thus, up to (but more likely a lot less than) 22 percent of con-
sumer units might purchase tickets during a full year.
INCOME LEVELS OF SPORTS TICKET PURCHASERS
Table 1 reports measures of central tendency for income levels of
consumers who do and do not purchase sporting event tickets.  The
unweighted mean personal income level of consumers who bought
sporting event tickets shows that they enjoy average incomes 59 per-
cent above those who do not purchase sporting event tickets.9   The
weighted mean weights the income levels of households that bought
tickets by their expenditures on tickets and is a more accurate reflection
of the personal income levels of those who typically use the tickets.
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Not surprisingly, the weighted mean shows a larger income gap (85
percent) between consumers who do and do not purchase tickets to
sporting events.  We also report median income levels because mean
income levels can be affected by extremely high incomes of a few con-
sumers and by the 1994 CES practice of “topcoding” all incomes
exceeding $300,000 at $300,000.10  Using medians, the difference
between the two groups is 92 percent.  
Depending on the measure of central tendency, sporting event con-
sumers have incomes from 59 to 92 percent above the levels of con-
sumers who do not buy sporting event tickets.  When consumers who
buy sporting event tickets are mixed with those who do not, the 1994
median income level is $23,194.  Thus, the median income level of
consumers of sporting event tickets is 84 percent above the overall
median income level.  This number is in contrast to the 58 percent dif-
ferential for season tickets and 10 percent differential for single-game
tickets in 1972–1973.  Because only a small fraction of the consumer
units purchase tickets, the reported averages for those who buy no tick-
ets at all are always close to the overall U.S. average income.
In computing weighted means, those consumers purchasing a dis-
proportionate share of tickets to sporting events have a greater effect on
the average income level.  The small sample size of 1,147 consumer
units that purchased sporting event tickets risks placing undue reliance
on the consumption patterns of relatively few consumers.  To assess the
sensitivity of our results to this possibility, we eliminate households







A. Consumers who purchase tickets to 
sporting events
$48,288 $56,124 $42,663
B. Consumers who do not purchase 
tickets to sporting events
$30,350 $30,350 $22,258
C. Ratio of A:B 1.59 1.85 1.92
SOURCE: Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1994 (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
a Incomes are in nominal 1994 dollars.
The Economics of Sports 63
that individually account for over 5 percent of the total expenditures
for sporting event tickets in a quarter.  This criterion eliminates seven
households (two low-income and five high-income), after which the
weighted-mean income of consumers of sporting event tickets drops
from $56,124 to $55,883.  This still exceeds the mean income of con-
sumers who did not purchase any sporting event tickets by 84 percent.
To maintain individual respondent confidentiality, the CES top-
coded income at $300,000 in 1994.  Four percent of households that
purchased sporting event tickets were topcoded in contrast to 1.6 per-
cent of households that did not purchase sporting event tickets.  Top-
coding causes a greater downward bias in the income level of
consumers of sporting event tickets than in the income levels of con-
sumers who do not buy sporting event tickets.  It thus causes our calcu-
lations to understate the differences in income levels between sports
consumers and others.  Topcoding also reveals that sporting event tick-
ets are more than twice as likely to be purchased by consumers with
income exceeding $300,000 as are other goods and services.
The conclusion is clear.  Incomes of consumers who purchase
sporting event tickets are significantly greater than incomes of consum-
ers who do not buy tickets to sporting events.  If we were able to
include in the analysis individuals who enjoy access to tickets pur-
chased by small businesses and corporations and those who have
leased luxury boxes, the difference surely would be even greater.
Ticket prices to minor league contests and college games are substan-
tially lower than ticket prices to premier league professional games.
Because our analysis combines all of these types of events, it undoubt-
edly understates the income gap between those who attend major
league professional sporting events and the general public.  As more
new stadiums with relatively more luxury boxes and club seats are
completed, the gap will continue to grow.
INDIRECT EVIDENCE FROM TARGETED ADVERTISING
Consumer Expenditure Survey data do not identify the particular
sports events for which tickets are purchased.  To explore differences in
income levels among the fans of different sports and to assess the rea-
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sonableness of our CES-based estimates, we collected information
about advertising in event programs, in stadiums and arenas, and on
televised broadcasts of games.  Advertising in event programs is
directed at individuals who attend the events.  Advertising on televised
broadcasts is directed at people who watch the games on television.
Advertising in the facility is directed at both groups, as those who
attend the games see signage in the stadium or arena, and those who
watch on television may see the signage too.
Advertising in event programs thus provides information that
should match the information we collected from the CES.  Our analy-
sis of income levels of consumers based on advertising assumes that
advertisers direct their messages at people who are most likely to pur-
chase their products.  We expect to find that the products purchased fre-
quently by sports fans who buy tickets are advertised in event
programs.  Products that are likely to be purchased by sports fans who
view games on television are likely to be advertised during television
commercials.  By looking at the income levels of the consumers of
these products, we can infer the income levels of those who attend
games and those who view them on television.11
To assess the income levels of the consumers of the various goods
and services targeted by each advertising type, we first classify the spe-
cific product advertised and then identify the median income of all
consumers of that product from the CES.  If an advertiser sells prod-
ucts in various CES categories, we assign the advertisement to all of
those categories and average the median incomes of consumers of
products in the various categories to create a representative income
level for the target audience of the advertisement.  We aggregate the
income levels across the various products advertised via a particular
medium (e.g., event program or signage or television) for each of the
four professional team sports by calculating the median of the median
incomes of consumers of the various advertised products.  The proce-
dure is illustrated in Table 2, which reports the advertisers in a ran-
domly selected Baltimore Orioles baseball game program and the
respective median income levels of the consumers of the products sold
by the advertisers.
Our research assignment consisted of reviewing many spectator
programs, advertisements on stadium walls and scoreboards, and view-
ing over 30 televised games.  The latter was accomplished by videotap-
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Table 2 Baltimore Orioles Program Advertisements with 
Corresponding Median Income Level of Consumers 
of the Products or Services Advertised
Products or services advertised
Median income levels of consumers of 
product or service based on CES
($)
Bacardi rum 23,480






Old El Paso (food) 25,000
Sprint (telephone service) 25.781
Coca-Cola 27,979
Milk 27,979
Powerade (sports drink) 27,979
Deer Park (bottled water) 27,979
Rawlings Sporting Goods 28,110
Energizer batteries 29,820
Value City Furniture 31,213
Bravo Card (ATM card) 31,425
Matrix (hair care) 33,801
State Farm Insurance 34,000
NationsBank 34,125
First Union Bank 34,125
First National Bank 34,125
J.C. Penney (department store) 37,000
Montgomery Ward (department store) 37,000
St. Agnes Healthcare 37,850
Sheraton Inner Harbor Hotel 37,895
Motorola (electronics) 41,091
Adventure World (amusement park) 41,161
66 Siegfried and Peterson
Table 2 (continued)
Products or services advertised
Median income levels of consumers of 








Trane air conditioning 49,313
Office Depot 50,175
Tuxedo House (tuxedo rental) 52,215
Cellular One 67,018
Median of the median incomes of 
consumers of products advertised 37,063
ing the games and reviewing the tapes.12  The peculiar twist to our
research is that we fast-forwarded through the games and watched the
advertisements at normal speed!  
There are some inherent weaknesses in this approach.  First, prod-
ucts often are differentiated to appeal to people of different means.  The
CES does not distinguish product categories in terms of the income of
the target audiences, however.  There is no separation of  “restaurants
for high-income people” from “restaurants for low-income people.”
Premium brands of imported beer are lumped in with local generic
beers.  Because we group together differentiated products targeted at
low- and high-income consumers, our advertising-based method of
estimating consumer income levels should reveal less divergence
between the income levels of sports consumers and the income levels of
nonsports consumers than actually exists.
A second problem is securing sufficient data.  In several cases, our
sample sizes are sufficiently small that the evidence is anecdotal rather
than systematic. We are missing signage information for basketball and
television broadcasting information for football.  We report medians to
67Table 3 Consumer Income Levels by Sports Advertising Targetsa
Event programs Facility signs Television advertising
Sport Income ($) N Ratiob Income ($) N Ratiob Income ($) N Ratiob
Baseball 31,898 10 1.43 33,391 9 1.50 36,277 20 1.63
Basketball 39,075 2 1.76 n/ac n/a n/a 40,711 8 1.83
Football 38,189 6 1.72 29,682 3 1.33 n/a n/a n/a
Ice hockey 40,255 2 1.81 37,642 6 1.69 37,065 4 1.66
Mean of medians across 
all sports
37,326 33,572 38,016
Median income of 
households that do not 
purchase tickets to 
sporting events
22,258 22,258 22,258
SOURCE: Authors’ survey and Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1994 (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
a Incomes are in nominal 1994 dollars.
b Ratio is the ratio of the respective income levels to the income levels of consumer units that do not purchase tickets to sporting events.
c n/a indicates that no data were collected.
68 Siegfried and Peterson
avoid distortions caused by topcoding incomes. Although the adver-
tisements were run in 1997, the median income levels we assign to the
products are from the 1994 CES. Thus the income data are in 1994
nominal dollars. All of the estimates based on the targets of advertising
are reported in Table 3.
EVENT PROGRAMS
We assembled randomly selected game programs from 10 major
league baseball teams, seven professional football teams, two profes-
sional basketball franchises, and two professional ice hockey teams.
The median of the median income levels of consumers of the various
products advertised in baseball programs ranged from $27,980 at Phil-
adelphia Phillies games to $38,500 for those of the Chicago White Sox
games.  The mean over 10 sampled baseball teams was $31,898.  
The corresponding median income level targeted for fans of the
seven football teams ranged from $35,000 for Seattle Seahawks fans to
$40,225 for those of the Chicago Bears.  In basketball, the Indiana Pac-
ers had a targeted median income level of $37,895; the Minnesota Tim-
berwolves,  $40,255.  Both ice hockey teams in the sample (the Detroit
Red Wings and the Tampa Bay Lightning) had identical median
incomes of consumers of products advertised in their program of
$40,255.
The ratio of the estimated income levels of consumers of products
advertised in game programs to the income levels of consumers who
do not purchase tickets to sporting events (from the CES) is also
reported in Table 3.  It ranges from 1.43 for baseball to 1.81 for ice
hockey.  The ratios for basketball, football, and ice hockey, ranging
from 1.72 to 1.81, are relatively close to the comparable ratio of 1.92
based on the CES data on sports event ticket purchases.  This is espe-
cially so in light of our expectation that the advertising-based estimates
would understate the gap in income levels between sports ticket pur-
chasers and others.13  The ratio for baseball is noticeably lower than for
the other three sports.  Perhaps this is because the lowest-priced tickets
for baseball games are substantially below the lowest-priced tickets for
the other three sports thereby attracting a different clientele to games.
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STADIUM OR ARENA SIGNS
Stadium signs are directed both at people who attend the live
events and at the television audience.  A similar procedure was used to
compute median incomes for the targeted consumers of stadium or
arena advertisements for each team in our sample.  These incomes
were then averaged over the teams and are reported in Table 3.
The median income of the consumers targeted by signage ranges
from $28,010 at Los Angeles Dodgers games to $38,500 at Florida
Marlins games.  For the eight baseball teams common to the sample,
the simple correlation between the estimated income levels of advertis-
ing targets of event programs and those using stadium signage is +0.36.
The medians for the three football teams range from $26,808 for the
Buffalo Bills to $34,126 for the Oakland Raiders; and for the six ice
hockey teams from $35,000 for the Detroit Red Wings to $39,000 for
the Colorado Avalanche.
In contrast to event programs, which are targeted only at people
who attend games, football stadium and ice hockey arena signs appear
to target lower-income consumers who may be viewing televised
broadcasts.  The income levels of those targeted for baseball signage,
however, do not differ much from those targeted by baseball event pro-
gram advertising.  This inconsistency may reflect the inaccessibility of
football and ice hockey event tickets to lower income consumers who,
therefore, substitute television viewing for live attendance.  However,
the income levels of fans who attend baseball games and those who
watch them on television diverge less, perhaps because baseball con-
sumers generally have access to lower-priced bleacher seats.
TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENTS
Because television commercials are directed at those who are not
attending the events in person, we might expect to observe a continua-
tion of the income-level trends that became apparent as we moved
from event programs to facility signage.  To assess these income levels,
we recorded all of the advertisements on 32 nationally broadcast
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games.  The sample includes 20 baseball games, eight basketball
games, and four ice hockey games.  Because the teams varied and the
games were broadcast nationally, we do not distinguish income levels
by teams.
Only ice hockey advertising follows the expected trend of targeting
lower-income fans for products advertised on televised games than for
products advertised in event programs, and then only modestly so.14
We find little difference between the median income of the consumers
targeted in televised basketball advertising and that of consumers tar-
geted in basketball game programs.  In baseball, the median income of
targeted consumers of products touted on televised broadcasts actually
exceeds the median income of consumers targeted in game programs.
If anything is to be learned from the differences, it is that fans of foot-
ball and ice hockey are split by income level, with the more affluent
viewing games in person.  For baseball, the opposite appears to be true;
and for basketball, there is no discernible difference in income levels of
fans sitting in the arena and those sitting on the couch watching televi-
sion.  The median income level of consumer units targeted on all sports
television broadcasts is similar, ranging from 63 percent to 83 percent
above the income levels of consumers who do not purchase tickets to
sporting events.  Thus it appears that television viewers of sporting
events have incomes modestly below those fans who attend the games
but are still relatively affluent.
Patterns of household access to televised sporting events undoubt-
edly contribute to the affluence level of television viewers.  The per-
centage of individuals who watch some television does not vary much
by household income level (ranging from 91 percent for households
with income levels less than $10,000 annually to 92 percent for house-
holds with income levels between $20,000 and $30,000 to 89 percent
for households with income levels exceeding $50,000 in 1996).  How-
ever, the percentage of individuals who view cable television does vary
substantially by household income level, from 42 percent for house-
holds with income levels less than $10,000 annually to 58 percent for
households with income levels between $20,000 and $30,000, to 74
percent for households with income levels exceeding $50,000 in 1996
(Statistical Abstract of the United States 1996, p. 561).  A considerable
proportion of televised sporting events is distributed exclusively on
cable television, including, but not limited to, ESPN and ESPN2.
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CONCLUSION
Consumers of sporting event tickets enjoy incomes substantially
above the average.  Although consumers who watch games on televi-
sion appear to have lower incomes, they too are affluent in comparison
with the nation’s overall average income. 
A careful documentation of the redistributional effects of public
subsidies for sports facilities requires an accounting of the distribution
of the subsidies to the teams (which are generally divided between
players and owners, almost all individuals in both groups being very
affluent), an assessment of the incidence of indirect benefits such as
community image enhancement or the enjoyment of “following the
local team,” and an evaluation of the incidence of the funding mecha-
nisms (taxes and lotteries) used to raise the revenue.  One portion of
the redistribution—the consumers’ surplus flowing to fans—seems to
favor relatively more affluent individuals.  The remaining aspects of
the redistribution are easier to assess intuitively and support specula-
tion that the public funding of sports facilities redistributes wealth from
individuals with lower and middle incomes to those with much higher
incomes.  Whether this redistribution is desirable or not, depends on
one’s views about its fairness and about the assessment of other eco-
nomic effects of publicly funded stadiums and arenas.
Notes
Siegfried is Professor of Economics at Vanderbilt University.  Peterson earned Honors
in Economics and graduated with a B.A. from Vanderbilt University in 1998.  T. Ald-
rich Finegan, Malcolm Getz, Allen Sanderson, and Andrew Zimbalist provided helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1. The desired size and amenities of a stadium are also affected by its financing.  As
the team’s share of incremental construction cost declines, it will elect a larger
and better outfitted facility.
2. A notable exception is Zimmerman’s (1998) analysis of the distributional conse-
quences of the federal tax exemption for municipal bonds.
3. This count does not include indirect team ownership such as Rupert Murdoch’s
News Corporation’s ownership of the Los Angeles Dodgers.
4. In several of the sports leagues (e.g., NFL, NBA) players share added revenues
with owners on the basis of formulas instituted in conjunction with payroll ceil-
ings that were negotiated between owners and the players’ union.
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5. The relevant net gain to sports ticket buyers is the difference between the consum-
ers’ surplus they enjoy from the opportunity to purchase tickets and what they
would have received from buying the goods and services that would have been
purchased by them were the sporting event tickets not available.
6. About one-fifth of the sample is replaced by new households each quarter so that
after five quarters the entire sample has turned over.
7. Ticket revenues for the four premier league men’s professional team sports in the
U.S. were $2.0 billion in 1996 (Financial World 1996).
8. The out-of-town tickets comprise 28 percent of combined total expenditures on
sporting event tickets and would include tickets purchased to playoff tournaments
and college football bowl games.
9. The difference in means is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence
level.
10. The topcoding threshold is now at $1 million annual income.
11. This approach was originally suggested to us by Allen Sanderson of the Univer-
sity of Chicago.
12. There are no football games in the sample because the data were collected during
the spring and early summer of 1997.
13. Corporate marketing guides we obtained from the Baltimore Orioles (baseball)
and Chicago Bears (football) reported income distributions of spectators that
imply 1994 median incomes of $53,587 and $43,436, vis-a-vis the income esti-
mates of $34,063 and $40,225, respectively, derived from the targets of game pro-
gram advertising.  Thus, both teams are touting higher incomes for their
customers than any of our estimates.
14. Among the four different sports, ice hockey ticket prices are the highest.
 References
Baade, Robert A.  1987.  Is There an Economic Rationale for Subsidizing
Sports Stadiums? Policy study no. 13, Heartland Institute, Chicago, Illi-
nois.
______.  1994.  Stadiums, Professional Sports, and Economic Development:
Assessing the Reality.  Policy study no. 62, Heartland Institute, Chicago,
Illinois.
______.  1996.  “Professional Sports as Catalysts for Metropolitan Economic
Development.”  Journal of Urban Affairs 18(1): 1–17.
Clotfelter, Charles T., and Phillip J. Cook.  1989.  Selling Hope.  Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Coats, Dennis, and Brad R. Humphreys.  1999.  “The Growth Effects of Sport
Franchises, Stadia and Arenas.”  Journal of Policy Analysis and Manage-
ment 14(4): 601–624.
The Economics of Sports 73
Financial World.  1996 (May 20). 165(8): 56–59.
Gorham, John, Peter Kafka, and Shailaja Neelakantan.  1998.  “The Forbes
400: Bill Gates and Paul Allen Welcome 37 New Members to an Exclusive
Club.”  Forbes, October 12: 165.
McElroy, Katherine Maddox, John J. Siegfried, and George H. Sweeney.
1982.  “The Incidence of Price Changes in the U.S. Economy.”  Review of
Economics and Statistics 64(2): 191–203.
Noll, Roger G., and Andrew Zimbalist.  1997.  Sports, Jobs, and Taxes.  Wash-
ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Okun, Arthur M.  1975.   Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff.  Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
O’Sullivan, Arthur.  1996.  Urban Economics.  Chicago: Irwin.
Pechman, Joseph A.  1985.  Who Paid the Taxes, 1966–1985?  Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Rosentraub, Mark S.  1997.  Major League Losers: The Real Cost of Sports
and Who’s Paying for It.  New York: Basic Books.
Siegfried, John J., Katherine Maddox McElroy, and George H. Sweeney.
1982.  “Who Bears the Burden of Excise Taxes?”  Challenge 25(2): 61–63.
Statistical Abstract of the United States.  1996.  “Multimedia Audiences—
Summary: 1996.”
Zimmerman, Dennis.  1998.  “Subsidizing Stadiums: Who Benefits, Who
Pays?” In Sports, Jobs and Taxes, Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist,
eds.  Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, pp. 119–145.










W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007
 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
 
The economics of sports / William S. Kern, editor.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–88099–210–7 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 0–88099–209–3
(paper : alk. paper)
1. Professional sports—Economic aspects—United States. I. Kern, William S., 





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007–4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by J.R. Underhill.
Index prepared by Nancy Humphreys.
Printed in the United States of America.
